Timor link, no. 33, June 1995 by unknown
Number 33 
June 1995 
East Timorese agree to keep talking 
East Timorese representing pro-
independence and pro-integrationist 
opinion met for the first time under UN 
auspices on 3-6 June. Pro-independence 
groups were unhappy that discussion of 
East Timor's political status had been 
ruled out. But all participants agreed that 
the dialogue was a positive step and called 
for it to continue. 
The intra-East Timorese dialogue, agreed at the January ministerial meeting between 
Portugal and Indonesia ( Timor Link 32, page 
5) took place in a medieval castle, 140 km south 
ofVienna, in Schlaining, Austria. 
The UN secretariat had difficulty drawing up 
a list of East Timorese participants. The 
Indonesian government rejected the first list of 
names put forward, saying it had not been 
consulted. This led to a postponement of the 
meeting, originally scheduled for 24-26 April, 
while candidates more to the taste of the Jakarta 
regime were added to the list. As a result, the 
round of talks between Portugal and Indonesia, 
scheduled for 19 May in New York, was also 
postponed until 8July. 
The Indonesian government was so anxious 
to control what happened in the meeting that 
it bussed several thousand East Timorese into 
Dili to demonstrate against the inclusion of 
prominent dissident exiles. Thirteen of the 
nominees chosen by Jakarta addressed the 
demonstration , stating that they supported 
Indonesian ru le over the territory. The 
Portuguese news agency, Lusa, reported on 24 
April that the East Timorese legislative assembly 
had issued a declaration rejecting a referendum 
on East Timor's status and reaffirming 
integration with Indonesia. Apparently, 
members of the Dili legislative assembly who 
disagreed with the declaration were not allowed 
to vote on it. 
Notwithstanding these tensions, the UN held 
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Street trader in Dili market, March 1995 
Summary 
This isme of Timar Link reports on the 
challenges to Indonesia's military occupation 
of East Timor. We bring news of increasing 
activity from the urban underground 
resistance, a more independent stand from 
East Timor's protestant church, and the 
growing importance of East Timor to 
Indonesian movements for change. We give 
updates on the Timor Gap oil treaty hearings, 
and official investigations into the Liquica 
massacre. We also report on the first UN-
sponsored meeting between pro-indepen-
dence and pro-integrationist Timorese. We 
reprint in full translations of two documents 
from this meeting: its final declaration and an 
address by Bishop Belo. 
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i firm on its list of invitees. The Jakarta regime, 
with two or three extra nominees of its own, 
0 
~ eventually decided to participate. J The 30 participants in the June meeting 
" included exiles as well as East Timorese still 
living in East Timor. They ranged from 
prominent opponents of integration such as 
Jose Ramos Horta, leader of the National 
Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), to 
pro-integration Timorese such as Francisco 
Lopes da Cruz. 
Resistance leader Xanana Gusmao was not 
permitted to leave his prison cell to join the 
talks. He would probably have refused in an)' 
case. The content of the talks, as defined by the 
UN communique of9 January, was confined to 
cultural, traditional and religious issues, rather 
than substantive political differences. Xanana 
criticised this in his address to the parliamen-
tarians' conference held in Lisbon at the end of 
May: 'If in fact the cause of East Timor's 
problems resides in the fact oflndonesia having 
forcibly annexed the territory, then of what 
importance is reconciliation amongst East 
Timorese?' However, he did contribute a three-
page letter to the dialogue. 
Unofficial reports of the meeting, which was 
conducted in Portuguese, varied; some partic-
ipants described it as tense, others as friendly. 
Bishop Carlos Belo played an important role 
in keeping the two sides talking. He dissuaded 
J oao Carrascalao (leader of the Timorese 
Democratic Union) from quitting the meeting 
despite the exclusion of political questions from 
the agenda In his homily at the Sunday mass, he 
called for reconciliation: 'God has already 
forgiven the mistakes of 1974 and 1975, and 
now is the time for the Timorese to forgive each 
other.' 
The overall impression was that whilst the 
meeting was emotionally charged, and recon-
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NEWS FROM EAST TIMOR 
ciliation desired , deep differences remained. 
Ines Almeida, one of the CNRM participants, 
afterwards expressed appreciation fo r Bishop 
Belo's role . Of the East Timorese participants, 
she said , 'They would not allow the terror of 
Indonesia to stand between them. They used 
thi s opportunitv to , in stead , enhan ce an 
environment of real dialogue regardless of their 
differe nces in political views, which, 20 years 
experience tells them, can be a good ingredient 
for real democracy in an independent East 
Timor' .* 
The agenda items addressed included demil-
ita risation , security, human rights , and the 
scaling down of the military presence , with 
transfer of power to civilian leaders. 
A sixteen-point document tabled by Bishop 
Belo was approved by consensus and annexed to 
the final document of the meeting (see page 8'). 
The final 'Burg Schlaining Declaration ' calls 
for further dialogue through more meetings, to 
be held immediately before each round of nego-
tiations between Indonesia and Portugal. 
The most politically significant section of the 
declaration is its expression of support for UN 
General Assembly resolu tion 37 / 30. This 
resolution asks the Secretary General to initiate 
consultations with all directly concerned parties 
to come to a settlement, and asks the UN GA 
'Committee of 24' (the special committee on 
Decolonisation) to continue to monitor the 
situation in East Timor, recognising Portugal as 
the continuing administering power. 
UN representative Tamrat Samuel comment-
ed that the UN was 'satisfied and happy with the 
result, which fulfilled our expectations and laid 
the ground for further cooperation '. 
The CNRM, while unhappy with the limited 
agenda, nevertheless issued a statement appre-
ciative of the UN's efforts . It said the talks 
represented 'a further valuable step forward in 
Burg Schlaining Declaration 
The Timorese, meeting in the All Inclusive Intra-
Timorese dialogue onjune 3-51995 in 
Schlaioiog, Austria, in the framework of the 
initiatives of the United Nations Secretary 
General: 
Expressing their gratitude and greetings to the 
Secretary General and his staff for this initiative: 
Taking note with appreciation and thanking the 
generous hospitality of the Austrian Government 
in welcoming the participants; 
Expressing their gratitude for the voluntary con-
tribution by several countries towards the holding 
of this meeting; 
Recognising the invaluable contribution of the 
Catholic Church in East T'unor in the past and at 
present in East Timor; 
Bearing in mind the contribution of His 
Excellency Rev. Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo 
in the course of this Intra-T'unorese dialogue; 
Noting that in spite of the frank and open spirit in 
which this lntra-Timorese dialogue was 
conducted, the fundamental different political 
options are unchanged; 
DlcldellD: 
1. Salute the presence of H.E. Rev. Dom Carlos 
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Among the participants were: I 
Living outside TllllOI": Jose Ramos Horta 
(CNRM), Constancio Pinto (CNRM), Ines 
Almeida (CNRM),joao Carrascalao (UDT), 
Vicente Guterres (UDT), Zacarias da Costa 
(UDT),Jose Luis Guterres (Fretilin), Mari 
AJkatiri (Fretilin), Abilio Araujo (Fretilin 
Committee in Portugal), Abilio Sereno (Fretilin 
Committee in Portugal), Jose Martins (KOTA), 
Manuel Tilman ('reconciliation'), Father 
Francisco Fernandes ('reconciliation'), Father 
Constancio ('reconciliation'). 
From East Tnnor itself: Bishop Ximenes Belo, 
Abilio Osorio Soares (Governor), Francisco 
Lopes da Cruz (ambassador in Suharto's 
service), Mario Carrascalao (former Governor, 
currently Indonesia's ambassador to Romania), 
Francisco Xavier do Amaral (first chairman of 
Fretilin, currently leader of the Indonesia-
Portugal Friendship Association), Domingos 
Soares (Administrator of the Dill municipality), 
Joao Mariano Saldaoha, Florentino Sarmento 
(attended the first 'reconciliation' meeting), 
Annindo Maia (Vice Rector of the Loro Sae 
University of Dill), Salvador Ximenes Soares 
(member of Indonesian Parliament), 
Clementino dos Reis Amaral (former member 
of Indonesian Parliament), Antonio Parada 
(assistant in the Provincial Government), 
Guilherme Maria Goncalves (former East 
Timor governor). 
the UN Secretary General's efforts to seek a just 
and genuine solution to the problem'. • 
* The all-inclusive intra-East Timorese dialogue: a 
small but critical step forward for East Timar by 
Ines Almeida. 
Filipe Ximenes Belo, Apostolic Administrator of 
the Diocese of Dill, for his invaluable contribu-
tion in the course of the debate, such as proposals 
for concrete measures that were agreed upon 
with a view to improving the physical and spiritual 
conditions of the lives of the people of East 
Tim or; 
2. Propose to the UN Secretary General the 
holding of another Intra-Timorese dialogue in the 
same framework in which this one was 
undertaken with a view to continuing the debate 
on the is.mes annexed, preceding each round of 
negotiations between the diplomatic heads of 
Portugal and Indonesia; 
3. Reaffirm the need to implement the necessary 
measures in the field of human rights and in the 
various areas with a view to promoting peace, 
stability, justice and social harmony; 
4. Reaffirm the necessity for the social and 
cultural. development of East T'nnor on the basis 
of the preservation of the cu1tunl identity of the 
people, induding tradition, religion, hiltOJy and 
language 11well11 the teaching of Tetun and 
Portuguese; 
5. Exp1es1e1 the need to creme the._. for the 
More bad news 
than good 
Jakarta has no policy for East Timor except 
more repression. In the long term change 
may come from an Indonesian movement 
for more freedom and human dignity, 
writes Gerry van Klinken. 
The news in East Tim or today is mostly about more repression, with li ttle change in sight. 
There is good news too, but it lies far off in the 
future . Let's have the bad news first. 
Riots in several East Timorese towns in 
November last year demonstrated that 
frustration with Indonesian colonial rule is 
growing rather than weakening. They coincided 
with silent commemorations of the Santa Cruz 
massacre on 11 November I991, bu t also had a 
clear economic motif. The rioters took it out on 
bazaar stalls owned by fo reigners, wh o are 
perceived as having taken over their economy. 
Outside observers must recognise the contem-
porary nature of th is resistance, because it 
precludes quietist hopes that ' time heals all 
wounds' . 
The riots had several resul ts. Many hundreds 
of mostly Chinese East Timorese with money, 
fearing more unrest, found their way to Australia 
and applied fo r asylum there. Government-
sponsored thugs (' ninja') for a time reappeared 
on the streets of Dil i a t n ight, terrorising 
supposed opponents. An effective ban on foreign 
journalists visiting the territory remains. 
A separate development was that President 
Suharto quashed a proposal circulating within 
the government to give East Timor some formal 
autonomy. The proposal was made confiden-
tially by East Timor Governor Abilio Osorio 
involvement of all East Timorese without discrim-
ination of any sort in the development of East 
Timor in every sphere of human life in a climate 
of mutual understanding, tolerance and harmony; 
6. Affirm the importance of the ongoing negotia-
tions between the governments of Portugal and 
Indonesia under the auspices of the Secretary 
General of the United Nations with a view to 
finding a just, comprehensive and internationally 
acceptable solution to the question of East T'unor 
according to the provisions, letter and spirit of 
the UN General Assembly resolution 37 /30. 
7. Register with appreciation the consultations 
undertaken by the United Nations with the 
various shades of T'unorese opinion, aiming at 
their gradual involvement, as well as the awilabiJi. 
ty of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Portupl 
and Indonesia for direct dialogue with 'I'imorelle 
penonalities; 
8. Request the good offkll!ll of the UN Seaemy 
Genenl and of the goveaWidB of Porluplwl 
lndoDellia to fadlltate the fne lllOfflllellt of die 
Tlmonle ..... toandhmE.t'llmor. 
BurgSdalaini• 
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Soares in May 1994. It appeared to enjoy the 
backing of Colonel Prabowo Subianto, a rapidly 
rising star in the Indonesian armed forces who 
is married to the president's daughter. Many 
governments (including those of Australia and 
the USA) chimed in, seeing in it a way of 
reconciling a concern about human rights 
abuses with an anxiety to retain good relations 
with Jakarta. However in November President 
Suharto made it clear autonomy was not on the 
cards and ought not to be discussed further. 
Governor Soares was withdrawn to Jakarta for a 
lengthy indoctrination course. 
The impression thatJakarta now has no East 
Timor policy other than more repression was 
strengthened by the early replacement of East 
Timor military commander Colonel Kiki 
Syahnakri by Colonel Mahidin Simbolon. The 
latter is an officer in the elite Kopassus unit 
responsible for the worst abuses throughout 
Indonesia. Major-General Adang Ruchiatna, 
Syahnakri's superior, reflected mainstream army 
feeling when he declared in March he could 
only solve East Timor's problems with more 
troops, even if this damaged Indonesia's inter-
national image. The clandestine movement was 
'everywhere', he complained. 
What about the United Nations? Aren't the 
newspapers reporting UN-sponsored talks in 
Austria this June? Yes, and they may turn out 
to be more important than many think. But we 
should be clear about them. They are not nego-
tia tions between competent officials, but 
discussions between East Timorese from inside 
and outside Indonesian-controlled territory. 
Their agenda, agreed during a long-drawn-out 
series of meetings between the Indonesian and 
Portuguese foreign ministers hosted by the UN 
Secretary General, specifically excludes 
discussion of East Timor's political status. 
Indonesia likes to trace East Timor's problems 
to the civil war before the Indonesian invasion 
in 1975, and wants the format of the talks to 
strengthen that portrayal. 
Indonesian protests about the list of partici-
pants (drawn up by UN Secretary General 
Boutros Ghali) led to a two-month postpone-
ment of the talks. When they did start, 
Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Politics 
and Security Soesilo Soedarman said they would 
have no political impact, while President Suharto 
said Indonesia would never give up East Tim or. 
The UN Secretary General also repeatedly talked 
down East Timorese hopes that he could force 
a resolution to the festering problem. Never-
theless, there are hopes the discussions may 
snowball into negotiations-by-proxy, since they 
do include most resistance leaders. 
The good news, of greater long-term than 
short-term significance, is that East Timor is 
increasingly important to Indonesians who want 
change. A broad and loose coalition of students 
and other intellectuals, retired military and civil 
servants, religious and legal-aid figures uses the 
language of freedom and justice from the 1945 
national independence struggle to ask: why after 
50 years does the Indonesian state today so 
resemble its colonial predecessor? The press, 
though fettered since June 1994, gives such 
TIMOR LINK June 1995 
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EAST TIMOR: lime for change 
Timor, area 7 ,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western 
part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was 
for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony. 
In 1974 Portugal decolonised East Timor, 
whose newly formed political parties began 
dmcussing options for the future - federation 
with Portugal, independence, or integration 
with Indonesia. The Timorese Democratic 
Union (UDT) initially favoured the first 
option but then joined a coalition with the 
nationalist liberation movement, Fretilin, to 
demand independence. A small third party, 
Apodeti, was used as a vehicle for Indonesian 
propaganda in favour of integration. 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene if 
Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil 
war, 1,500 people lost their lives. By 
September 1975, however, Fretilin was in 
control of virtually all of Portuguese Timor, 
following the defection of Timorese colonial 
troops to the liberation movement's side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and continued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
-.ranees that Jakarta would respect the right 
of the East Timorese to independence. In 
September 1975 Indonesia closed West Tunor 
to journalists and on 7 December it launched 
a full.scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. East TDDorwas 
proclaimed the '27th province' of Indonesia. 
The invasion and annexation of East 
Timor has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, 
a cbinl of the population, have died as a result 
of Indonesian rule. But the majority of 
Timorese have not accepted subjugation: 
Indonesia has been unable to eliminate the 
desire of the East Timorese for self-detenni-
nation and an armed resistance movement 
still remains in the hills. 
Although the invasion has been 
condemned by successive UN resolutions, 
the international community has done little 
or nothing to implement them, given the 
major economic and geopolitical interests of 
the United States, Japan and particularly 
Australia in the region. Indonesia's crucial 
strategic location and regional status - it has 
the world's fifth largest population, and large 
reserves of oil and other natural resources -
have all encouraged the world to downplay 
East Timor's agony. 
In recent years, however, several events 
have combined to break East Tunor's isolation 
and bring its continued occupation to inter-
national attention. In 1989 the Pope visited the 
territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still 
considered the administering authority of 
East Timor by the UN, created huge expec-
tations of change. To great disappointment in 
East Timor, the delegation was forced in 
October 1991 to call off its visit. 
On 12November1991 Indonesian troops 
shot and killed up to 300 East Timorese 
civilians during a funeral procession held at 
the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dill, the East 
Timorese capital, for a victim of repression. 
Witnessed by foreign journalists, the Santa 
Cruz massacre provided indisputable 
evidence of Indonesian atrocities. 
The Santa Cruz massacre has forced 
governments around the world to criticise 
Indonesia's brutality, injecting new impetus 
into diplomatic efforts to bring about a 
solution to East Tunor's suffering. Since 1983 
the UN Secre1ary-General has been entrusted 
with the achievement of a settlement to the 
dispute; and with the post-Cold War era 
providing a new intemabonaJ. climate for nego-
tiations, Indonesia faces inaea.ed prelliUre to 
reach a solution with Portugal and the East 
TDDorese under the auspices of the UN. 
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questions wide play. 
S\'mbo lic centres of the coalition are 
\l egawati . daughter of Indonesia' s founding 
President Sukarno and leader of the small Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia (POI), andAbdurrahman 
Wahid, leader of the mass Islamic organization 
NU. V\-l1ilst it is too early to say East Timor is a 
central item on its list of demands, its more 
idealistic 11ing sees there precisely the kind of 
struggle the\' themseh·es always dreamed of. 
Spec tacular acts of resistan ce by the East 
Timorese clandestine movement excite their 
admiration. A number of Indonesian human 
rights organisations are now active in East Timor. 
Even the Indonesian National Commission 
on Human Rights has finally dared to touch East 
Timor. This government-appointed body sees 
itself as a pressure vent for popular anger about 
human rights abuses, hoping thereby to prevent 
a Philippine-style democratic explosion . But it 
has issued several strong statements on contro-
versial incidents involving the armed forces in 
Indonesia. In early March it criticised the killing 
of six civilians by an army patrol in East Timor two 
months earlier. It will soon open an office in Dili. 
Xanana in a Jakarta jail is a more effective 
opinion-maker now than he was in the 
mountains of East Timor. Former East Timor 
Governor Mario Carrascalao, now Indonesian 
Ambassador in Romania, said recently that 
Xanana was the only genuine representative of 
the anti-integrationist position. He went on to 
suggest that for President Suharto to speak with 
the deposed Fretilin leader Abilio Araujo, as he 
is intending to do, was rather pointless. 
Few expect this diverse democratic opposition 
to change the regime in the near future. Indeed, 
most think Suharto will stand unopposed in 
1988 for another five-year term. Barring an 
unexpected breakdown in the currently tense 
relations between the Presidential Palace and 
Armed Forces Headquarters, the opposition will 
not be able to force the pace of change in the 
short term. When the regime does change, it is 
likely the President will not be as powerful as he 
is now. This may offer the window of hope that 
many in Indonesia and East Timor are praying 
for. • 
Gerry van Klinken is a lecturer at the School of 
Indonesian Studi£.s, Griffith University in QJ,teensland, 
Australia. 
Timor Gap hearings: Hardly April in Paris 
Portugal has brought an action against 
Australia in the International Court of 
Justice, challenging the legitimacy of the 
Indonesian-Australian Timor Gap oil treaty. 
Dr lain Scobbie outlines the legal 
arguments. 
February in the Hague was cold and damp, although unaffected by the severe floods 
afflicting other parts of the Netherlands. Even so 
an unending drizzle fell from the dull metal sky, 
foreshortening the panorama beyond the plate 
glass windows of the hotel whose top floor 
housed the Portuguese team in the East Timor 
case. In the mid-ground of this vista, the gothic 
finger of the clock tower of the Peace Palace 
pointed through a ring of trees. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal 
tenant of the Peace Palace; for three weeks in 
February it was the daily destination of partici-
pants in the oral proceedings in the East Timor 
case brought by Portugal against Australia. 
Portugal, as the applicant state which initiated 
the case, presented its arguments during the 
first week. Australia then had a week to plead 
its defence . After this, each was given the 
opportunity to present final brief arguments in 
order to reinforce its own case and to answer 
points made by the other. This might give the 
impression of a nightmare of perpetual lawyerly 
discourse and chatter, mirroring the continual 
drizzle outside, but during the first two weeks 
the court sat only in the mornings from lOam to 
round about 1 pm. It would err on the side of 
the cynical to attribute this to the relatively 
advanced age of the judges. Both teams of 
law\'ers need time - from lunchtime to, often, 
early the next morning - to prepare for their 
4 
appearance in court. Although two exchanges of 
lengthy written arguments precede the oral 
hearings, the case only comes into clear focus 
during the oral arguments. Only then do the 
precise issues and arguments on which each 
party rests its case become apparent. Its 
opponent then knows the spin which has to be 
given to the counter-argument, and the 
additional research and writing which remains 
to be done. 
It might appear odd that the parties to the 
proceedings were Portugal and Australia rather 
than East Timor and Indonesia. This looks like 
a wedding with neither bride nor groom. 
However, under Article 34 of the court' s 
statute, only states can be parties to cases. East 
Timor is not a state and thus could not appear 
on its own behalf to challenge the legality of 
Indonesia's occupation and complain of its 
human rights abuses. Further, Article 36 of the 
statute requires that states must give their 
consent to being a party to a case - this consent 
can be given for a particular case or in advance 
for a defined class of cases. Indonesia has never 
consented to the court's jurisdiction in matters 
connected with East Tim or. Even if East Tim or 
were an independent state, it could not bring a 
case before the ICJ which complained of its 
treatment at the hands oflndonesia. 
On the other hand, Australia and Portugal 
have given their consent to the court's jurisdic-
tion for an open-ended class of disputes. In 1979, 
Australia concluded a treaty with Indonesia 
providing for co-operation in exploiting 
hydrocarbon resources lying offshore between it 
and East Timor. This gave Portugal the 
opportunity to raise an action. 
The substantive point at stake in the case is 
relatively narrow: did Australia act lawfully in 
concluding the Timor Gap Treaty with 
Indonesia? Howe\'er the potential implications 
are wide-reaching because the case revolves 
around the East Timorese people's right to self-
determination. Whether the court will 
pronounce on that issue remains to be seen. As 
an initial plea, Australia argued that even though 
both parties had consented to the court's juris-
diction, it was still not competent to decide the 
merits of the case. 
On the court's competence, Australia's 
complaint is that, in the first place, Portugal is not 
entitled to represent and protect East Timorese 
interests internationally. Coupled with this, 
Australia argues that the Court is not entitled 
to hear the merits of the Portuguese claim 
because any decision which it might give would 
also rule on Indonesia's rights and interests. As 
Indonesia has not consented to jurisdiction, 
Australia claims that the court must divest itself 
of jurisdiction. This argument attempts to 
develop a line of reasoning in the court's 
jurisprudence which can be traced back to its 
judgment in 1954 in the Monetary gold case. A 
third, and essentially subsidiary, argument is 
that Portugal is suing the wrong state and should 
have directed its complaint against Indonesia, 
not Australia. 
The dispute as to whether Portugal is entitled 
to act on behalf of East Tim or in the first place 
might be seen to raise an acutely valid point. 
Why should Portugal take this responsibility 
upon itself? 
The Portuguese answer to this is quite clear: 
until the Indonesian invasion in 1975, East Timor 
was a Portuguese colony. The United Nations 
had designated East Timor as a non-self-
governing territory entitled to self-determina-
tion and laid a duty on Portugal to ensure that 
this occurred. Until this right is freely exercised, 
Portugal remains the representative of East 
Timor in international affairs. This is also 
recognised by the United Nations which has 
identified Portugal as East Timor's administer-
mg power. 
Australia claims that, by virtue of the passage 
of time and Portuguese inaction, it has 
abandoned this responsibility. This allegation 
was virulently denied by Portugal throughout 
the oral proceedings. 
Only if the court rejects this Australian 
objection, and the technical procedural 
argument based on the Monetary gold case, can it 
proceed to decide the merits of the case. The 
Portuguese claim is that by concluding the Timor 
Gap Treaty with Indonesia Australia infringed 
Portugal's rights to represent East Timor in inter-
national affairs. 
Moreover - and more importantly- Portugal 
claimed that the conclusion of the treaty also 
breached the right of the East Timorese people 
to self-determination. In particular, it breached 
this right's economic aspect, encapsulated in 
the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources. Simply by establishing a 
framework for offshore exploration and exploita-
tion, Australia deprived the East Timorese 
people of control over the use of their natural 
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resources. This breach of the doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty will be aggravated should 
any resources be extracted from any area of East 
Timor's continental shelf. 
The Australian counter-argument takes an 
interesting route. It claims that, because there 
has been no agreement which allocates shelf 
areas to it and East Tim or, Australia was entitled 
to conclude the treatywith the authorities who 
have effective control over East Timor. It asserted 
that, if it could not do so it would be unable to 
explore or exploit hydrocarbons which might 
lie in that offshore area. Accordingly, Australia 
claimed that without this agreement, the exercise 
of its right to permanent sovereignty over its 
natural resources was prejudiced. 
Although this Australian argument may 
appear ingenuous, its underpinning is significant 
as it recognises the relevance of the doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty. Moreover, Australia did 
not deny that the East Timorese people had a 
right to self- determination. Rather, it claimed 
that this right had been exercised in 1976 when 
the 'People's Assembly' voted in favour of incor-
poration into Indonesia. 
In sum, a striking feature of this case is that the 
parties are in substantial agreement regarding 
the governing law and what that law requires. 
Their disagreement boils down to a different 
appreciation of the facts. Analysis of the ICJ's 
work only shows that it is virtually impossible to 
predict its decisions. Enlightenment should 
come soon. The court was expected to deliver 
judgment at the end of June. • 
Dr Scobbie is senior l,ecturer in international law at the 
University of Glasgow. He was counsel to Portugal in 
the East Tim or case. The views expressed in this paper 
are purely personal and should not be attributed either 
to the government of the Republic of Portugal or to his 
coll,eagues in the case. 
Resistance 
continues: a 
visitor's report 
In the six months since the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APECJ meeting in 
Jakarta, the situation in East Timor has 
been extremely volatile. Edward Olsen-
Hafstad reports on the mood during his 
visit in March 1995. 
The urban clandestine movement has increased its activity, which largely takes the 
form of demonstrations or mass response to 
violence or intimidation by the occupying 
Indonesian military forces. In the common view, 
this shows that the underground resistance 
remains strong and sufficiently adaptable to 
meet the new demands and strategies of the 
occupiers. 
Two killings have had a strong impact in the 
past three months: the reported massacre in 
Baucau, outside the parish Church, inJanuary 
TIMOR LINK June 1995 
and the killing of six civilians in the town of 
Liquica (see page 6). The number killed in Baucau 
is unclear and as yet the justice and peace 
commission of the diocese has made no inves-
tigation. A number of sources report that local 
church officials are wary of reporting the 
incident for fear of reprisals. In Liquica the 
opposite was true. Effective reporting from the 
local parish brought the killings to international 
attention and ensured that the new Indonesian 
National Human Rights Commission undertook 
an immediate investigation. 
The commission 's report contradicted the 
military description of the incident as 'a military 
engagement' , calling it a fabrication , and 
demanded action against those responsible. 
Although most Timorese express little 
confidence in Indonesian national institutions 
the Commission 's report met with a positive 
response. It is likely that the officers responsible 
for the Liquica killings will receive harsher 
penalties than those given to the military 
responsible for the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, 
to satisfy international opinion. There are strong 
rumours that the present military commander in 
East Timor will be removed but there is some 
trepidation as to who will replace him. But with 
the clandestine networks as strong as ever oppor-
tunities to demonstrate rejection of 'integration' 
will continue to be taken and the military will 
not temper its brutality. 
The Indonesian policy of divide and rule and 
application of a form of low intensity conflict 
are having a substantial impact. The 'ninja ' 
gangs, groups of Timorese youths paid by the 
military to carry out night-time terror raids on 
critics oflndonesian integration, have produced 
a heightened state of fear. Although during my 
stay in Dili these attacks were said to be muted, 
actions by ninja gangs in other towns and villages 
were reported. Recruits for the ninjas are said to 
come from the growing numbers involved in a 
martial arts youth culture. The development of 
martial arts clubs is heavily encouraged by the 
military and many of them take on a fanatical 
nature, similar to the Alsa Masa 'militia' groups 
in the Philippines. 
In Suai, to the south of the island, I learned of 
a plague of ninja gang attacks although I found 
it difficult to ascertain whether there had been 
any killings in the area. The town mayor, a 
Timorese with the confidence of the local 
population, retired last year and was replaced 
by a Javanese military officer. Since then , 
relations between the local government and 
church had taken a down turn . A priest 
complained that ninja gangs had trespassed on 
to the Parish church compound three times but 
when the police had been summoned to give 
assistance they had not responded. The church 
cites this as clear evidence that the police and 
military are behind the ninja gangs. In Suai, 
unlike Dili, no members of the niaja gangs have 
yet been caught and shown to be in the pay of the 
Indonesian authorities. 
Everywhere I visited there were great expec-
tations of the UN sponsored intra-Timorese talks 
to be held in Austria in April 1995 but postponed 
to June. I met a number of those from within 
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Timorwho had been invited by the UN Secretary 
General to participate in these talks. The general 
feeling was that nearly all those invited, from 
East Timor, Indonesia and th e Timorese 
diaspora, were known to be opposed in some 
way to integration. Even the governor, Abilio 
Osario, has made statements critical of the status 
quo, calling for some 'new' form of autonomy for 
East Tim or. Formerly supporters of integration 
increasingly recognise the situation for what it is: 
military occupation. The current absence of the 
governor on a so called six-month training 
course in Jakarta is seen as an attempt to keep 
him out of East Timor during a time of quite 
intense political activity. And some doubt that he 
will ever return to Dili . 
I came away from East Timor again heartened 
by the courage with which the mass of the people 
continue to resist the Indonesian occupying 
forces. However, in such a David and Goliath 
situation I found myself asking: ' how much 
longer can such a small population survive such 
brutal repression?' • 
Edward Ofsen-Hafstad is a development consultant 
and a member of the British Coalition for East Timor. 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
UN commission 
statement 
The Slst session of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights produced a 
'consensus statement' on East Timor. 
Alessandra Aula reports on the proceedings. 
The consensus statement congratulates the Indonesian government on its decision to 
invite the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
to visit East Timor in 1995. It requires that the 
UN Secretary General remains informed of the 
human rights situation in East Timor until the 
next session, when the High Commissioner is 
due to submit a report on his visit. 
The commission also expressed its deep 
concern about continuing human rights 
violations, in particular recent tensions and the 
murder last January of six East Timorese by 
Indonesian soldiers in Liquica. It appealed to 
the Indonesian government to continue its 
enquiries about the people still missing and the 
circumstances surrounding the violent 'incident' 
which took place in Dili on 12November1991. 
East Timor was a particularly sensitive issue 
this year, given the defeat of a resolution in the 
last session of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. 
Negotiations are now under way between the 
Portuguese foreign minister, his Indonesian 
counterpart, and representatives of the National 
Council ofMaubere Resistance (CNRM) . These 
have assumed a more flexible and conciliatory 
approach. 
Nevertheless, the NGOs, including Pax Christi, 
and several states (western countries, particu-
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larly Portugal and Canada) did not spare the 
Jakarta government. In particular, they raised 
the questions of: 
• self-determination 
• the detention and trial ofXanana Gusmao, 
leader of the East Timorese resistance 
• the fate of people who have disappeared, or 
been killed, detained or exiled. 
'I'he strategy of CNRM, led by Jose Ramos 
Horta, was to present testimonies of the tragedy 
lived by many East Timorese, and to negotiate 
the consensus statement. • 
Af£ssandra A ula is assistant permanent representa-
tive at the UN for Pax Christi International. 
Liquica: 
Indonesia admits 
civilians killed 
The Indonesian authorities have been 
forced to admit that Indonesian soldiers 
killed six East Timorese civilians in Liquica 
earlier this year. 
Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights has accepted that the killings in Llquica 
on 12January (Timur Link 32, page 3) were 'a 
grave violation of human rights'. The 
commission confirmed that military officers had 
engaged in torture aimed at extracting 
confessions of resistance sympathies and activity, 
and that they had carried out 'unlawful killings'. 
Five of the victims were lined up in front of a 
ditch and shot. A sixth was tortured and killed 
separately, his body left near to the other five. 
Indonesian military sources originally 
described the victims as armed members of the 
East Timorese resistance. However, this claim 
was widely disputed, and under pressure from 
several directions, the Indonesian government 
asked its human rights commission to investigate. 
The results were revealing, and served to boost 
the reputation of a body which had originally 
been dismissed by many as unlikely to 
demonstrate independence. 
The inquiry soon got to the truth, since 
individual accounts from different members of 
the platoon concerned were contradictory, and 
eye-witnesses refuted much of the military 
version. 
In the phrasing of its statement the 
commission trod a careful path between telling 
the truth and alienating the military. On 1 
March, former Supreme Court Justice Ali Said 
declared that the commission 'deeply regrets 
the incident'. 
While the report does not expose the full 
culpability of the army, it goes some distance to 
defend itself from accusations of failure properly 
to investigate human rights abuses in East Timor. 
Antara news agency reported on 29 May that 
two soldiers will appear before a military tribunal 
in Denpasar on 2June charged with killing the 
six East Timorese. The two are named as 
Jeremias Kasse and Rusdin Maubere. • 
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Balibo: 
Twenty years on 
Australian and British governments failed 
to react to the killing of their own nationals 
when Indonesia invaded East Timor in 
1975. Hugh Dowson reports on continuing 
efforts to expose western complicity with 
the Indonesian occupation. 
Balibo, as yet, is not even a name to most Britons. But what happened at Balibo 20 
years ago was a trigger for rape, mass-murder, 
and deliberate starvation of up to 200,000 East 
Timorese by the Indonesian military. 
In October 1975 two teams of TV news 
reporters arrived at Balibo to film Indonesia's 
week-old covert invasion of East Timor. Had one 
or other team escaped with their films, full-scale 
invasion would have been aborted. Indonesia's 
ends would have been pursued by other means. 
Instead, both teams were executed. 
Indonesia's president had not ordered these 
executions. He knew that the west was 
monitoring the invasion. Fearing that his inter-
national standing would not survive the outraged 
publicity, President Suharto ordered his generals 
to halt their invasion. By remaining silent over 
the executions at Balibo, the Australian and 
British Labour governments gave an important 
signal to Indonesia: the military regime read the 
silence as a green light to resume the invasion 
and genocide. 
Balibo is a key event in the East Timorese 
catastrophe, and pressure has mounted for a 
proper inquiry. Between 14 February and 17 
May this year, 115 British MPs signed House of 
Commons Early Day Motion 607. This calls for 
a proper inquiry into the executions (see box). 
Of the signatories, seven are Conservative MPs, 
two Ulster Unionists, 15 liberal Democrats, one 
Plaid Cymru and 90 Labour. 
The British Foreign Office responded almost 
immediately, telephoning Maureen Tolfree 
(sister of Bristol-born Brian Peters) and inviting 
her to meet Foreign Office parliamentary under-
secretary Tony Baldry MP. There was one 
condition - that she must go alone. Not until 
EDM 607 had 60 signatures was this condition 
dropped (asof5June ithad 128). Thus when Mr 
Baldry met Maureen on 20 April, she was 
accompanied by her MP and EDM co-sponsor, 
Roger Berry. 
At the meeting, Mr Baldry handed over 
photographs of the burial of the five newsmen 
inJakarta, Indonesia, on 5 December 1975. 
These, he insisted, had been sent to Brian's 
family at the time. They did not arrive. He also 
handed over a bundle of papers, some of which 
were sent to Brian's family in 1976-notably the 
dismissive official documents issued by the 
Australian government. 
Among the previously unreleased papers is a 
letter to the Foreign Office from the official who 
represented Britain's Labour government at the 
funeral of Brian and Malcolm (the two Britons, 
both with Channel 9, Sydney) and the other 
EDM 607 - Killings in East Timor 16.10. 75 
That this house notes that the British television 
newsmen, Malcolm Rennie and Brian Peters, 
were killed, with three other Australian-base 
newsmen, at Balibo, East Timor, on 16th 
October 1975, to prevent them infonning the 
world that Indonesia had begun its invasion of 
East Timor; notes that the Australian Foreign 
Minister Evans confumed this when he stated, 
in the Australian Senate on 7th June 1994, that 
the five newsmen were executed in a major 
military invasion; and therefore urges Her 
Majesty's Government to institute an inquiry 
into the Balibo killings of 16th October 1975. 
newsmen (two Australians and a New Zealander, 
all with Channel 7, Melbourne). No member of 
Brian's family was invited to the funeral. 
The EDM can be signed by MPs until 
November this year. By then it may have gained 
publicity from the visit of James Dunn, an 
authority on East Timor, whose pamphlet and 
UK speaking tour coincide with the 20th 
anniversary of the Balibo executions. (Further 
information: Tel 01225 464234) • 
Hugh Dowson is a member of the British Coalition 
for East Timur. 
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AUSTRALIA 
Boat people from 
Eastlimor 
A group of 18 East Timorese including a small 
baby have fled Timor by boat, landing in Darwin 
under Australian Coast Watch escort on 30 May 
after five days at sea. According to the Canberra 
Times (30 May 1995) this is the first group to 
escape by boat for almost 20 years, but may be the 
first of several. 
The Australian authorities have prevented the 
asylum seekers from making contact with the 
East Timorese community in Darwin, and 
instead taken them to a remote detention centre 
in Derby, Western Australia. Many of the 
refugees have relatives in Darwin who are willing 
to take them in. 
It is understood that the group members have 
been constantly harassed by the Indonesian 
military forces since the Santa Cruz massacre of 
November 1991, in the belief that they are 
members of the underground resistance. 
Parliamentary conference 
An international conference on East Timor for 
concerned parliamentarians took place in Lisbon 
from 31 May until 2 June. Hosted by the 
Portuguese National Assembly's special 
committee on East Timor, it was attended by 
some 77 parliamentarians from 32 countries. 
The meeting adopted a declaration containing 
a 25-point programme of action, and decided to 
create a permanent structure for Parliamentar-
ians for East Timor (PET), founded in 1988. The 
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participants also signed a statement of support for 
Indonesian parliamentarian Sri Bintang 
Pamungkas. He had been invited to attend the 
Lisbon meeting, but was unable to do so as he is 
currently being investigated by the police. 
Parliamentarians from outside Portugal 
insisted that a strong plan of action was agreed 
and an international board of parliamentarians 
set up to develop communications between 
national groups. This will work with the 
secretariat of PET, currently based in Ottawa, 
Canada, whose work will be strengthened and 
boosted by this conference. 
SENEGAL 
Indonesian military 
condemned 
The joint assembly of the Asia-Caribbean-
Pacific/European Union parliamentarians has 
passed a strongly-worded resolution criticising 
Indonesian military actions in East Timor. The 
parliamentarians, meeting in Dakar, Senegal 
between 30 January and 3 February 1995, 
condemned the violence in Dili and Baucau at 
the time of the fifth round of negotiations 
between Portugal and Indonesia in January. The 
resolution condemned the Indonesian 
government's defiance in the face of interna-
tional censure, affirmed the rights of the East 
Timorese to discuss political questions in the 
CHURCH 
Protestant leader 
speaks out 
The East limorese protestant church, the 
Gereja Kristen di Timor Timur, is small in 
comparison with the majority catholic 
population, but it is growing. Its moderator, 
Reverend Ar1indo Marcal, is beginning to 
assert its independence from Indonesian 
church and state authorities. 
Deverend Marca! attended a consultation on 
l\East Timor organised by the World Council 
of Churches and the Christian Conference of 
Asia in 1994. At the consultation, he was sur-
prisingly outspoken: 
'The events of 12 November 1991 were the 
fruits of ... frustration. Similar feelings were 
related to the more recent events of 12 
November 1994. The anger and frustration of 
the people of East Timor has once again put 
them under the international spotlight. Global 
attention in relation to East Timor again raises 
the question whether integration into Indonesia 
is the desire of the East Timorese. 
'Development programmes or schemes are 
meant to provide progress and welfare for the 
East Timorese. However, without political 
development such measures have no meaning. 
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forthcoming dialogue, expressed solidarity with 
Bishop Belo, and called for an arms embargo 
against Indonesia. 
NEW ZEALAND 
Dili massacre 
damages 
The New Zealand government promised at the 
end of May to press for a response from 
Indonesia to an award for damages to the mother 
of a Santa Cruz massacre victim in a Boston 
court. General Panjaitan, in command of the 
army in East Tim or at the time of the massacre, 
was prosecuted under US law last year whilst 
studying at a Boston business school. Helen 
Todd, mother of Kamal Bamadhaj, was awarded 
NZ$21.5 million, which she has vowed to share 
with the relatives of other victims, should the 
award ever reach her. 
GERMANY 
Stormy reception for 
Suharto 
President Suharto, on a trade-related visit to 
Germany in early April received a welcome he 
had not bargained for. Well informed of 
Indonesian repression of journalists, NGOs and 
In this kind of situation, how do we resolve the 
issue of East Timor whereby people can fully 
accept integration and the international 
community can also be satisfied that no injustice 
has been done? 
'After almost twenty years of attempts at 
integration the East Timor question remains 
unresolved, both in the minds and hearts of the 
East Timorese as well as in the eyes of people 
outside. 
'Integration can only be accepted as a result 
of the implementation of the right of self-deter-
mination of the East Timorese people. The East 
Timorese should be provided the opportunity to 
determine for themselves whether they really 
want to be integrated into Indonesia or not, 
whether they want to be independent. There is 
need for openness among all the parties 
involved, including the people themselves whose 
lives are affected by this issue. 
'We should seek a way which is acceptable to 
all parties. The government which has developed 
East Timor for about 20 years should be 
confident enough to invite an open dialogue 
which could culminate in an acceptable 
resolution of the issue'. 
During a recent visit to the USA and Canada, 
Reverend Marca! gave a personal account of 
developments in East Timor: 
'When the Indonesian government occupied 
East Timor in December 1975, my family fled 
to the mountains to join the resistance 
movement. I was 15 years old at the time. We 
stayed in the mountains for four years, and lived 
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trade unionists as well as the atrocities in East 
Timor, hundreds of people poured into the 
streets of Dresden waving banners and banging 
drums. A performance at the Dresden opera 
planned in his honour was cancelled when the 
orchestra refused to play, and his visit to the 
Zwinger portrait gallery had to be cut short. As 
had been the case in Weimar, the president was 
declared unwelcome in Dresden by leaders from 
four out of the six groups in the Dresden 
parliament because of human rights abuses in 
Indonesia. 
Repression of the kind prevalent in Indonesia 
remains an undimmed memory for the 
inhabitants of former East Germany, as does the 
habit of resistance. This sensitivity certainly 
contributed to the reaction in Dresden. 
The Indonesian regime has blamed the 
demonstrations on a small number of 
Indonesians and East Timorese living in or 
visiting Germany at the time. The regime has 
since pursued them with determination, 
describing them as 'insane and irrational'. 
Indonesian security agents were sent to Germany 
to trace the organisers of the demonstrations, 
but were refused permission to investigate by 
the German authorities. In fact the demonstra-
tions were organised by a variety of German 
organisations, activists and NGOs. 
One Indonesian blamed for the trouble is the 
MP Dr Sri-Bintang Pamungkas, (see above) who 
had undertaken a lecture tour in Germany and 
the Netherlands shortly before Suharto's visit. 
under very difficult circumstances. Four years 
later, after realising that integration with 
Indonesia has become a reality in East Tim or, we 
came down from our mountain hide-out and 
surrendered. We were immediately arrested and 
placed in labour camps. My parents were sent to 
another camp and later disappeared, presumably 
killed.' 
He was baptised and confirmed a protestant 
during his time in the labour camp. After his 
release he went to study in Java, and when he 
returned to East Timor was ordained a pastor. 
'As a pastor of the Protestant church of East 
Timor, I fully participated in the life of our 
Protestant church in East Tim or and in the wider 
church federation of the Indonesian Council 
of Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di 
Indonesia) . 
'And in my own personal life, I also become 
more fully integrated as an Indonesian citizen. 
I married an Indonesian who is a lieutenant in 
the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI). We have 
one son. 
'However, in the course of events, particular-
ly after the incident at Santa Cruz cemetery in 
November 12, 1991, I began to raise serious 
questions with myself ... 'Who is really benefiting 
from this integration process? Why is East Timor 
still under military occupation? Why are East 
Timorese people still left out of the economic life 
of the region? Why is it that, in large measure, the 
economic sector is so overwhelmingly 
monopolised by Indonesians? Why do East 
Timorese people still feel segregated and why 
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are we continually being denigrated by 
Indonesians?" 
- 'Furthermore, as a leader of the Protestant 
Church in East Timor, I began to feel strongly 
that our church is often considered to be a tool 
of the Indonesian government. Even Carlos 
Ximenes Belo, Roman Catholic bishop of East 
Timor, was very reluctant to deal with us. In 
addition, my Indonesian colleagues at the 
Indonesian Council of Churches often were 
silent on issues that affected the East Timorese 
people.' 
When Reverend Marca! was elected as 
moderator of the Protestant Church of East 
Timor, he proposed to the Indonesian Council 
of Churches that the East Timorese church 
should apply for separate membership within 
the World Council of Churches. At the Hong 
Kong consultation of the task force on East 
Timor, sponsored by the World Council of 
Churches with the Council of Churches in Asia 
and the Indonesian Council of Churches, he 
called for the full participation of the East 
Timorese people in the UN-sponsored dialogue 
about the future of East Timor. • 
Bishop Belo 
on the 
church's role 
Bishop Ximenes Belo was unanimously 
acclaimed as the key figure in the first 
intra-Timorese meeting {see page 1}. His 
intervention on 3 June was applauded by all 
the Timorese present and was a decisive 
first step in the progress of the 
discussions. His speech {full text of English 
translation below} was one of two 
unpublished documents appended to the 
final declaration. It has been sent to UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. 
Practical (or fundamental) questions: 
East Timor in the Catholic Church's perspective. 
1. The Church must in no way be mistaken for 
society, nor linked with any political system. It 
must be seen as the guardian of human tran-
scendence. 
2. There are no parties within the Church, and 
it is open to the pluralism of human choice. 
3.With regard to East Timor's political future 
(integration or independence) the position of 
the Church of East Timor is to accept any choice 
made by the Timorese. However, the Church 
proclaims and demands respect for human 
rights, in accordance with the UN Charter 
(1946) as well as promotion of the common 
good, based on respect for the religious, cultural 
and historic identity of the Timorese. 
4. The Catholic Church's mission in East Timor 
is to evangelise, sanctify and guide the faithful, 
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and to contribute towards the development of 
the human being as a whole. 
5. Throughout its history, the Church has always 
stayed very close to the people. Just like a 
mother, and especially these days, the Church 
deeply understands its children's pain, sorrows, 
and suffering, and is fully aware of the 
aspirations of the Timorese. 
6. The Timorese strive towards being masters in 
their own homes and their own land. They want 
to be respected as human beings and as 
Christians. 
7. The Church declares that, as long as the 
Timorese are treated as a defeated people and 
are turned into hostages in their own land, this 
will constitute a very significant obstacle in the 
way of their real, just and unimpaired 
development as human beings, as members of 
a family, and as Timorese. 
8. The Church has to state that material 
development cannot be considered 
development at all, if it does not go hand in 
hand with respect for basic rights which enable 
people to express their own feelings and give 
vent to their creativity. 
9. The Church is aware of the need for strength-
ening the realm of morality within society. 
10. The Church is convinced that, if the people's 
participation is to unite around the common 
good, each individual must appeal to his/her 
own conscience. When authority is based 
exclusively on threats, fear, intimidation and 
corruption, the common good suffers. The 
Timorese feel that they are annexed 
(conquered) and not integrated with a civilisa-
tion which is respectful of and in harmony with 
international law. 
11. The Church appeals for respect for the 
Timorese family that wants peace, tranquillity, 
work, and well being. The Timorese family has 
the right to set up its own villages, to work its own 
land, to decide on the number of children it 
has, and to exercise responsible parenthood, 
in accordance with the norms of Christian 
morality and in line with its own educated 
conscience. 
12. The Church considers the young people of 
Timor to be the hope of both the Church and 
of society. Young Timorese today are being 
blamed for all evils. They are exploited in all 
senses. They have no jobs and their future is 
uncertain. The Church appeals to the powers 
that be to respect the basic rights of the young, 
to enter into dialogue with them, and to involve 
them in the development of their own land. 
13. The Church believes that the Timorese have 
to be able to see that their values, customs and 
Christian traditions, as well as their ethnic, 
cultural, historic and religious identities are 
respected. The Church, therefore, appeals to 
political leaders to take into account the 
legitimate and fundamental aspirations of the 
Timorese. 
14. The Church appeals to Timorese politicians 
and leaders to learn from the lessons of the 
past, so they may contribute to the common 
good and superior interests of East Timor, 
harmonising their own ideologies and interests 
with the basic and civil rights of the people as a 
whole. 
15. The Church, to which most Timorese belong, 
seeks no privileges for itself, except the freedom 
with which to serve the faithful, promote the 
moral virtues of justice, peace and reconcilia-
tion, and contribute towards the physical, 
spiritual, cultural and moral well being of the 
Timorese. In this way the Church has a right to 
complete freedom of pastoral activity for the 
benefit of all sectors, including: 
a) the right to run religious and priesthood 
education centres; 
b) the right to run schools, hospitals and 
health centres; 
c) the right to recruit foreign missionaries; 
d) the right to propose a Christian way of 
regarding the family and responsible 
parenthood; 
e) the right to maintain its "media''. It also 
urges the powers that be to provide the people 
with correct, not manipulated, information. 
f) the right to acquire property, (movables 
and immoveables) and to receive assistance from 
abroad, so as to be better able to fulfil its mission. 
16. In view of the particular nature of its spiritual, 
religious, moral, cultural, social and human 
mission, the Church is willing to cooperate with 
all individuals of good will, as well as with public 
authorities, on the basis of moral order, for the 
sake of the dignity of the Timorese, and in the 
interests of comprehensive development, 
harmony, peace and justice. • 
Timar Link 
Subscription form 
D I wish to subscribe to Timor Link 
D I enclose my subscription fee of £ __ 
Address-------------
Individual £10.00 for 4 issues 
Institution £20.00 for 4 issues 
D I have previously subscribed to Timor 
Link 
D I am a new subscriber 
Please send cheques made payable to CllR. 
to East Timor Project, c/ o CUR, Unit 3, 
Canonbury Yard, 190A New North Road, 
LondonNl 7BJ. 
Tel 0171-354 0883, Fax 0171-359 0017. 
Timor Link is published with the assistance 
of the Catholic Institute for International 
J.teladom OD behalf of the Ea8t Timar 
Project. 
TIMOR LINK June 1995 
